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The thinkers presented in this paper, Jürgen Habermas, 
G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Danto and Ernst Gombrich, de-
vote signiﬁ cant time to the problem of modernity. For 
all of the ﬁ gures discussed save Gombrich, the issue of 
aesthetic modernity is linked to the changing role of 
philosophy. The aesthetic question discussed here cen-
ters on the critical problems encountered when explai-
ning the shift of art away from mimetic representation 
to a non-representative form in which it seems as if 
“anything goes”. From an art critical perspective, the 
locus of artistic evaluation moves from being a matter 
of taste to a matter of judgment. Following the criti-
cisms Habermas levels at Hegel, I use the aesthetic di-
mension of the problem of modernity as a point of de-
parture for exploring the advantages that Gombrich’s 
empirically based aesthetic theory offers.
Though Hegel is considered by most philosophers to 
be the last of the systematic metaphysicians, the other 
ﬁ gures discussed in the paper are representatives of 
the post-metaphysical era. Coming from the Frankfurt 
School, Habermas is rooted in the philosophical tradi-
tion of Marx and Hegel. Nonetheless, he seeks to brid-
ge the gap between the Continental and the Analytic 
traditions. Danto, known for his Analytical Philo-
sophy of History, explicitly rejects metaphysics and 
the idea that a philosopher can have future historical 
knowledge based on the presumption of a uniﬁ ed no-
tion of history. However, he, too, seeks to use analytic 
philosophy to clarify the “dogmas” of some thinkers 
of the continental tradition1. Habermas is aware of 
1 - In Daniel Dennett’s The Philosophical Lexicon, a collection consist-
ing of puns based on philosophers’ names, Dennett creates an entry 
referring to Danto as the “arthurdantist”: “One who straightens the 
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from optical ﬁ delity. Consequently, Gombrich is una-
ble to take seriously, among others, Marcel Duchamp, 
one of the twentieth-century’s most signiﬁ cant artists. 
This failure, in Danto’s view, invalidates Gombrich’s 
theory of pictorial representation. Thus, he dismis-
ses Gombrich’s theory outright, without recognizing 
the advantages of the theory that Gombrich himself 
appeared unable to leverage3. Gombrich’s taste for art, 
as well as his own historical expectations, may have led 
him to assess what Danto calls post-historical art in a 
less than stellar manner, much as Greenberg was una-
ble to see Brillo Box as art. Danto argues that in “our 
time” artistic interpretation requires the assistance of a 
body of theory, providing a conceptual understanding 
of artworks that exhibit few cues for visual interpreta-
tion. This necessitates the philosopher-critic’s role in 
interpreting the art of post-history. Despite its shortco-
mings, Gombrich’s theory provides an explanation for 
the divergent forms of contemporary art. Gombrich 
emphasizes the development of an artistic language, 
suggesting an interpretation of contemporary art that 
does not require art ceding its communicative capacity 
to philosophy. Rather than signaling a transition into 
a new era deﬁ ned by a radically different approach to 
artistic production, this would support the position 
that the interpretive aid called for in understanding 
3 - In Danto’s “Grand Street” essay we ﬁ nd his strongest criticisms of 
Gombrich. “And when I say that Gombrich’s thought does not much 
matter, I mean that what he said had, and can have, no considerable 
bearing on the art or the art-making of our times, nor be of value to 
those who might turn to his writings thinking they can contribute to 
the understanding of the bafﬂ ing art of this century, which seems so 
resolutely to have turned its back on the enterprise of making things 
to match perceptual reality”. Arthur Danto, “E. H. Gombrich”, in Grand 
Street 2, 2,1983, pp. 120-132. Here 122.
Danto’s narrative theory of history and addresses it se-
veral times in his writings2. These writings, however, 
are not the topic of this paper, for, though Danto es-
chews Hegelian metaphysics and his teleological notion 
of historical completion, his solution to the problems 
faced by the critics of modern art draws him very close 
to Hegel, the philosopher he calls his “mentor”. Though 
Danto concedes that Gombrich’s work has an inﬂ uence 
on his own, Danto is, nonetheless, critical of Gombrich. 
Gombrich’s body of work, though not philosophical per 
se, presents a rich theory of art based on the fallibilistic 
epistemology of Karl Popper. The aesthetic theories I 
address here belong to Danto and Gombrich. But when 
assessing the role of philosophy in so called post-mo-
dern aesthetic theory, I use Habermas’ critique of Hegel 
to draw out the differences in their underlying notions 
of modernity. The solution I argue for involves integra-
ting Gombrich’s empirical approach to artistic develop-
ment with a form of philosophical guidance that would 
mediate art’s self-understanding rather than dictate it. 
In After the End of Art, Danto argues that Gombrich 
fails to explain the shift of post-historical art away 
teeth of exotic dogmas.” Danto, often referring to Dennett’s lexical 
innovation, appears to accept this humorous depiction, conceding that 
he has sought to straighten a few of the “exotic” philosophies of the 
historical canon for, in his words, an analytical audience.    
2 - Habermas’ discussion of Danto’s narrative statements can be found 
in the following works. Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communica-
tive Action, vol. II: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston, Beacon Press, 1987, p. 
136. Jürgen Habermas, History and Evolution, Telos, 39, 1979, pp. 
5-44. Jürgen Habermas, “A Review of Gadamer’s ‘Truth and Method’”, 
in Understanding and Social Inquiry, ed. Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas 
A. McCarthy, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 
335-63.
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Gombrich’s multidisciplinary empirical studies would 
provide a method to show that the creation of contem-
porary non-mimetic art remains within the framework 
of a developmental learning process, and as the con-
temporary artistic language reaches a higher level of 
articulation, the interpretation of the philosopher is no 
longer required. 
THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE THEORIES OF HEGEL AND DANTO
Despite Danto’s clear rejection of Hegel’s metaphy-
sics, his narrative account of the historical shift away 
from modernism is vulnerable to criticisms that apply 
to Hegel’s account of the end of art, insofar as Danto’s 
theory also resolves the particularity of modern art into 
the unifying pluralism of the post-historical through 
philosophy. Danto holds that the internal drive of art 
created during the era of art is typiﬁ ed by two distinct 
but contiguous periods. The era of art begins around 
1400 with the progressive attempt to achieve optical 
ﬁ delity. During the twentieth-century, art attempts to 
deﬁ ne itself philosophically through its manifestos and 
the quest for purity. According to Danto, the era of art’s 
progression is completed when it is released from the 
universal constraints of self-deﬁ nition. When art un-
derstands what it is, it no longer seeks to deﬁ ne itself, 
and philosophy is invited to explain why artworks are 
art and interpret their signiﬁ cance. In Danto’s eyes, 
the way twentieth-century art is produced differs so 
radically from what came before it that it belongs to a 
new epoch. Danto’s claim ﬁ nds support among those 
arguing from the post-modern perspective. They hold 
that because the language of art has changed, what art 
is doing has changed; therefore, as far as artistic ex-
the art of today points to the artists’ rejection of inade-
quate modern icons coupled with an ongoing process 
through which the available visual metaphors are aug-
mented and reevaluated. 
I support Gombrich’s argument that art mani-
fests a progressive communicative structure through 
the following steps: 1) I apply Habermas’ critique of 
Hegel, which uses his theory of communicative ac-
tion to counter the notion that modernity has ended, 
to Danto’s end-of-art theory. Danto’s explanation for 
art’s change in narrative succumbs to the paradox of 
modernity —the task of forming a uniquely modern 
guiding principle without recourse to past traditions— 
in manner not unlike Hegel’s end-of-art theory. 2) I 
examine how Gombrich’s theory, which predicted the 
breakdown of artistic communication, provides an al-
ternative account of art’s historic “ground-zero”,4 sug-
gesting that the language of art is in the process of “re-
formation”. If applied with a more ﬂ exible notion of the 
visual schemata, this theory would not be vulnerable to 
Habermas’ critique. 3) I reexamine the relationship of 
philosophy and art, arguing that philosophy could be 
viewed not as a universal or unifying force, rather, as 
Habermas suggests, as a “stand-in” for a general theory 
with empirical application. In this capacity, philosophy 
could be viewed as a mediator, helping the specialized 
language of the arts establish meaningful connections 
with the audience. Applying a hypothetical thesis to 
4 - Skeptical critic Robert Morgan refers to the “re-formation” of the 
artistic language as “ground zero”. “The absence of experiential signiﬁ -
cation in art reduces the aesthetic to ground zero… Ground zero was 
the re-formation of language in art, a new semiotics, and a new contex-
tualization as to how to read art as an active agent within culture”. The 
End of the Art World, New York, Allworth Press, 1999, p. 38.
subjective particularity into philosophy’s universality.6 
In this way, for Danto, the role of the philosopher-critic 
is analogous to that of philosophy in Hegel’s absolute. 
Nonetheless, Hegel’s solution to the problem of art’s 
drive for self-understanding leaves the positive cultural 
forms that philosophy serves without guidance becau-
se the critical power with which history once endowed 
the artwork is no longer capable of giving imperatives. 
In Habermas’ words, “Hegel sees philosophy absolved 
of the task of confronting with its concept the decadent 
existence of social and political life. This blunting of 
critique corresponds to a devaluation of actuality, from 
which the servants of philosophy turn away”.7 Unable 
to provide substantive guidelines to modern culture, 
the critical import that philosophy offers is “blunted”. 
The place Danto allocates for the philosopher-critic in 
the post-historical artworld would, like Hegel, deny 
art its critical developmental power. In the Hegelian 
account of the end of art, the unifying Philosophy of 
the Absolute negates the positive forms of modernity 
represented in romantic art. Spirit withdraws from 
the decadence of ﬁ nitude at its highest level of deve-
lopment, leaving no role for philosophy in society at 
6 - In making this observation, it is important to recognize the shift 
Danto has taken away from his early work, Analytical Philosophy of 
History. In this work, he was adamant that philosophers were mistaken 
if they attempted to articulate the reality of “objective historical struc-
tures”, for history can only be spoken of coherently when referring to 
the past. Almost thirty years later, Danto confesses that he has a great 
deal more sympathy for such structures, arguing that each historical 
era manifests unique objective structures which could not have existed 
in previous epochs. See After the End of Art, p. 43.
7 -  Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: 
Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press, 1990, p. 43.
pression is concerned, we live in a new narrative epoch. 
Indeed, Danto’s observation that the philosopher-critic 
is a necessary player in the interpretation of the art of 
post-history is well founded, for the boundaries of the 
contemporary artworld are drawn such that art can be 
whatever it wants to be. Danto articulates the condi-
tions differentiating art from non-art in an essentialist 
deﬁ nition of art: the artwork must materially embody 
the intention of the artist. But art’s newfound freedom 
demands the interpretive capabilities of philosophy. The 
shift manifest in the post-historical era is, in Danto’s 
own terms, linked to the Hegelian end-of-art thesis. 
While Hegel’s end-of-art thesis takes the form of 
a critique of modernism, Danto’s is less critical of the 
modern age. Nonetheless, like Hegel, Danto’s deﬁ ni-
tion of art is linked to a notion of historical completion, 
albeit a narrative one. Danto builds on Hegel’s aesthe-
tic theory without being tied to it, putting a narrative 
twist on the prognosis that art will end with an analy-
sis of twentieth-century art history. Like Danto, He-
gel assumes the necessary dissolution of examples and 
norms of the past, but Hegel also presupposes society’s 
uniﬁ cation, through philosophy, in the dialectical reso-
lution of the Absolute. For Danto the need of the philo-
sopher-critic in interpreting the meaning of artworks 
created in the fragmented artworld of the post-histori-
cal era places the philosopher in an independent role. 
The philosopher, acting as the uniﬁ er of the “Babel of 
unconverging artistic conversations”,5 resolves art’s 
5 - Arthur Danto, After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale 
of History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 148.
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Danto’s claim that art has ceased to progress in a uni-
tary direction, and second, by suggesting an alternati-
ve relationship of philosophy to the aesthetic sphere. 
Habermas’ critique of modernity aims to overcome the 
philosophy of the subject that Hegel argued was mani-
fest in modernity’s relationship to the self. Hegel reali-
zed that a unifying concept is needed when society be-
comes aware of  “the dissolution of the exemplary past, 
and the necessity of creating all that is normative out of 
itself, as a historical problem”.10 Though the principle 
of subjectivity may provide a foundation, or normati-
ve orientation, for the spheres of science, morality and 
art, it may not be capable of “stabilizing a historical 
formation that has been set loose from all historical 
obligations”.11 The power of subjective reason is ins-
trumental; it possesses the capacity to foster notions 
of subjective freedom and reﬂ ection coupled with the 
critical ability to undermine religion, a previously uni-
fying force. Nonetheless, the principle that empowered 
modernity’s escape from the enchantment of religion is 
not able, under the power of subjective reason alone, to 
replace religion’s unifying potential.
Hegel’s presupposition of the concept of absolute 
knowledge provides a way to go beyond the subjective 
principle while still drawing on principles internal to 
modernity. But, Habermas points out, Hegel falls into a 
trap insofar as modernity achieves its self-understanding 
at the cost of losing the critical capacity of subjectivity.12 
10 - Ibid., p. 20.
11 - Ibid.
12 -  Ibid., p. 22.
the close of modernity. But in postulating the ongoing 
necessity for art’s philosophical interpretation, Danto 
belies his claim that art’s release from philosophical tu-
telage resolves this dialectical opposition. 
When art’s narrative is complete, when art no lon-
ger needs the direction of philosophy, art is free to “do 
what it wants”. The task of interpreting art’s meaning 
falls to philosophy. When art’s history is completed, it 
embraces all styles, and, according to Danto, ceases to 
develop in any particular direction. The “style of using 
styles” serves to unify the artworld8, and Danto’s philo-
sophical deﬁ nition of art as embodied meaning esta-
blishes the boundaries for this newly realized artistic 
era. Despite placing his theory within a narrative ra-
ther than a metaphysical framework, Danto’s account 
of the contemporary state of the arts remains close to 
Hegel’s. But the need for philosophy to act as the in-
dependent interpreter points to a problem, indicating 
the need for an alternative account of art’s historical 
development and the relationship of art to philosophy.
HABERMAS 
Jürgen Habermas’ challenge to the radical disconti-
nuity of “contemporary” and “modern” society applies 
to the end-of-art theses put forth by Hegel and Dan-
to. Habermas argues that some of the radical claims 
of those speaking from the post-modern perspective 
are merely “anti-Enlightenment” revolts disguised as 
“post-Enlightenment”.9 His critique offers an alterna-
tive position by providing an argument that challenges 
8 - After the End of Art, p. 10.
9 - Habermas, Discourse of Modernity, p. 5.
requires philosophy to communicate its embodied me-
aning. The experience of art is completed, according 
to Danto, through artists’ attempts to communicate 
the meanings they manifest in their works. With the 
disengagement of art from philosophy, Danto allots 
the task of explicating art’s meaning to philosophy. 
Though it is still the artist who divines the meaning of 
history the communicative task of art now falls within 
the purview of philosophy. This implicates Danto in 
the critique Habermas levels at Hegel.
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
For Habermas, the “unﬁ nished project of modernity” 
is linked to the emancipatory properties redeemable 
through the philosophy of language. Communicative 
action is found in language’s primary form. Strategic 
action is manifest in language used to effect some goal 
in the actions of the hearer; the rationality embedded 
within such speech is instrumental14. The apparent loss 
of the normative underpinnings of what some view as 
post-modernity is actually the colonization of the li-
feworld, the non-specialized sphere of everyday social 
interactions, by strategic interests. To complete the 
project of modernity, Habermas advocates reestablis-
hing communicative rationality within the lifeworld, 
and securing for philosophy the role of mediator bet-
ween the specialized rationalities of modernity and 
cultural forms of the lifeworld.
14 - Habermas bases the distinction between communicative and 
strategic action on Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and perlo-
cutionary speech acts. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Commu-
nicative Action. Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. 
T. McCarthy, Boston, Beacon Press, 1984, pp. 286-95.
Since the critical impetus of spirit, positively manifest in 
art, is resolved into the higher forms of religion and phi-
losophy, Hegel’s dilemma necessitates art’s dissolution. 
But the sublation13 places the critical guidance previously 
extant in the sensual form of art outside of artistic prac-
tice. 
Habermas’ critique of Hegel’s dissolution of art can 
be applied to Danto’s end-of-art thesis in two ways, 
which correspond to the two roles Habermas sees 
available for philosophy in a post-metaphysical world. 
First, if art has been sublated into its ﬁ nal form, freed 
from the constraints of history and the internal drive 
for self-deﬁ nition, it would not be dependent upon 
philosophy. The continued dependence on philosophy 
implies that the form, or history, of art is not complete, 
that the ‘project of modernity’ is yet to be completed. 
Second, analogous to Hegel, the way Danto views the 
dissolution of art’s history indicates more than a break 
with the icons and constraints of the past. Danto ar-
gues that with the narrative shift, the way art is made 
has changed. Couched in this assertion is the assump-
tion that art, in its freedom, is no longer compelled to 
communicate directly with the audience. The need for 
critical interpretation points to a deﬁ cit in an artwork’s 
capacity to independently convey its meaning.  Rele-
gating the task of communicating art’s embodied me-
aning or critical signiﬁ cance to the philosopher-critic 
points to a contradiction because art is not free if it 
13 - Sublation is the term some Hegel scholars commonly use to 
translate the German word aufheben. As Hegel uses the term, there is 
no adequate English translation. Aufheben can mean to save, to cancel 
or to lift up. Hegel’s philosophical usage of the term employs all these 
meanings, and more. See Michael Inwood’s entry on sublation in 
A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1992.
52 I 53
Regarding the question of why the delineation of 
art is left to philosophy rather than to the aesthetic of 
taste, Danto suggests tolerance because the plurality 
of art forms extant in today’s world of art will surely 
extend beyond the critic’s taste. Remaining within the 
bounds of subjective taste restricts one to a single seg-
ment of an artworld that accepts all styles. Despite the 
wisdom of this guidance, Danto does not envision art 
moving beyond this stage. His acceptance of the style 
of styles as the ﬁ nal state of the artworld, holds a per-
haps uncomfortable parallel to Hegel’s postulation of 
the Absolute’s uniﬁ cation of the ﬁ nite into the inﬁ nite. 
There is no more struggle; all styles are equal. But this, 
as Habermas claims of Hegel’s solution, “blunts” the 
critical import of art. If tolerance is the aim, then art’s 
capacity to engage in a progressive learning process, 
and to communicate to its audience matters of critical 
signiﬁ cance, is set aside. 
GOMBRICH 
While Habermas lays the groundwork for an alterna-
tive role for philosophy in relationship to empirical 
social sciences and the lifeworld, Gombrich provides 
an empirical study demonstrating that artists em-
ploy a visual language with a developmental structu-
re. In Art and Illusion, Gombrich charts how art of 
the Vasarian age progressed through a trial and error 
process by examining the historical evolution of the 
artists’ language or “schemata”. The schemata make 
up the toolset artists use in communicating the nuan-
ce and form evoked by the image. The accumulated 
knowledge of their use is passed on from generation 
to generation. For Gombrich, however, the schemata 
provide more than a means for artists to ply their illu-
Habermas’ solution to the problem of modernity 
makes room for an alternative account of the sea chan-
ge in art’s morphology while re-situating the role of the 
philosopher as the expositor of art’s meaning. Haber-
mas moves away from Hegel’s resolution of ﬁ nite into 
inﬁ nite, in which subjective consciousness resolves it-
self through uniﬁ cation in the universality of the Abso-
lute. Instead, Habermas argues that reason is neither 
subjective nor universal in terms of Hegel’s philosophy 
of consciousness. Rather, reason is manifest in the in-
tersubjective communicative norms of validity extant 
among individuals genuinely committed to rational 
agreement. This notion of reason would, in agreement 
with Hegel, act as a unifying force. Yet Habermas’ no-
tion of communicative action would not necessitate the 
resolution of reason’s critical drive into reason’s uni-
fying force. The critical force of reason does not entail 
the necessary progression of a process detached from 
its historical context. It involves argument and counte-
rargument, fostering a reciprocal progressive learning 
process. Within this format, historical example is not 
disengaged, but challenged and reinterpreted when 
placed under the scope of criticism.
In Habermas’ view, the paradox of modernity is to 
understand itself without recourse to its prehistory, 
which, nonetheless, provides the driving moment of 
its critical independence. Habermas argues that Hegel 
sees philosophy confronted with the task of grasping its 
own time —and for him that means the modern age— 
in thought. Hegel is convinced that he cannot possibly 
obtain philosophy’s concept of itself independently of 
the philosophical concepts of modernity15. 
15 - Discourse of Modernity, p.16.
ble.20 The downside of the vast array of choices availa-
ble to artists today is the near incomprehensibility of 
the language of art. Limits, according to Gombrich, 
serve a purpose in achieving communicability because 
“where everything is possible and nothing unexpec-
ted, communication must break down”.21
Gombrich’s preference for the efﬁ ciency of tradition 
is not reﬂ ected in the progress of history. In the late 
modern period, before the era of art had passed, Piet 
Mondrian insisted that artists break with the tradi-
tions of the past in order to bring out the universal in 
“a completely new art”.22 Though not all artists shared 
his purist goals, during the twentieth-century, artists 
like Mondrian abandoned art’s traditional and out-
dated schematic language. But the project of creating 
a new language for a new age was never completed. 
Consequently, artists lost the medium through which 
they communicated with their broader audience. As a 
result, the nascent language of the arts was only acces-
sible to the few who possessed its interpretive key.23 
20 - Ibid., p. 324.
21 - Ibid., p. 376.
22 - Piet Mondrian, The New Art - The New Life: The Collected Writ-
ings of Piet Mondrian, ed. and trans. Harry Holtzmann and Martin S. 
James, Boston, C. K. Hall, 1986, p. 169. See Roger Lipsey, “Piet Mon-
drian: The Universal Towers Above Us” in The Spiritual in Twentieth-
Century Art, New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1988, pp. 66-89.
23 - Morgan describes this phenomenon in terms of the complex-
ity of the artistic language: “If there are too few who understand the 
language of art, particularly the language of the avant-garde, then the 
game of conversation is bound toward monotony, an endgame clois-
tered by too many constraints”. The End of the Art World, pp. 14-15.
sionist craft. It is through our knowledge of images 
that we gain the means of recognizing and interpreting 
the world. The styles of artistic presentation, rather 
than merely depicting an independent world, embed 
within them the interests of the culture that produ-
ced them.16 Thus, the creation of images is a learning 
process that involves the tricks of illusion —how the 
eye reacts to visual sense— but also how the beholder 
understands and accepts the image presented.17 The 
interactive process that occurs among artists and be-
holders is a trial and error process. Gombrich obser-
ved that the artists of the modern period despaired of 
the tools with which they had to communicate, and 
they added more. But if the schemata and the catego-
ries of art become too ﬂ exible they will not serve their 
purpose.18 Gombrich argues, “The artist, no less than 
the writer, needs vocabulary before he can embark 
on a ‘copy’ of reality”.19 Finding the tools of their era 
lacking, the artists of the modern era began to create 
a new vocabulary. But when a new word is added to 
a language, it is understood within the context of an 
already developed language. Thus, a language made 
up of only new words and new syntax is unintelligi-
16 - In his article on Gombrich, Gregg Horowitz lists the ﬁ ve main 
points he argues. See ‘Gombrich, Ernst Hans Josef’ in The Encyclope-
dia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1998, p. 317.
17 - This concept is expressed in Gombrich’s account of sprezzatura. 
Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Picto-
rial Representation, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 
181-202.
18 - Ibid., p. 88.
19 -  Ibid., p. 87.
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lived world; it is more practically located in the inter-
subjective norms manifest in genuine attempts to com-
municate. Second, the role of philosophy should not be 
above the discipline it focuses on, acting as an “usher”. 
Rather, philosophy should mutually interact with the 
discipline, working to supply “ideas without raising 
foundationalist or absolutist claims à la Kant or He-
gel”. Habermas surmises that these ideas, fallibilistic 
in orientation… reject the dubious faith in philosophy’s 
ability to do things single-handedly, hoping instead 
that the success that has for so long eluded it might 
come from an auspicious matching of different theore-
tical fragments.26
Based on an alternative philosophical orientation, 
two points can be made regarding the philosophical 
and empirical theories of Danto and Gombrich. First, 
Danto’s assigning to philosophy the role of deﬁ ning art 
should be reconsidered in light of Habermas’ critique 
of the philosophical attempt to unify subjective parti-
cularity into independent rational structures that dis-
locate the primary communicative competency of indi-
viduals. Gombrich’s theory shows how artists “acquire 
and use” visual knowledge, revealing the internal ratio-
nale of a progressive learning process. Though it varies 
according to the epoch and the culture, Gombrich’s 
pragmatic approach reveals art’s method of transmis-
sion. The critical power of art lies in its ability to ad-
just and critique cultural preunderstandings through 
26 - Jürgen Habermas, “Philosophy as Stand-In Interpreter” in After 
Philosophy: End or Transformation? eds. Kenneth Baynes, James 
Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1987, pp. 
310-11.
Prima facie, Gombrich’s recognition that modern 
artists rejected their schematic tradition points to the 
end of a historical narrative. Here, Danto and Gombrich 
concur. As stated earlier, Danto counts Gombrich’s in-
ability to recognize Duchamp’s readymades as a falsi-
ﬁ cation of his theory deﬁ ning art as a trial and error 
process of mimetic depiction. Indeed, Gombrich seems 
to falter in applying his theory to contemporary art. 
But Gombrich’s theory can be employed to explain art 
of “our time” if we are willing to use Gombrich to look 
beyond Gombrich. Many, apparently Danto included, 
view Gombrich’s work as pertaining only to pictorial 
representation. Though most of Gombrich’s major 
works deal with mimetic art, nowhere in his work does 
he commit to the notion that all art is representative.24. 
Though Gombrich’s own taste may have prevented him 
from applying his theory of “schema and correction” to 
non-mimetic art, a fruitful alternative to the aesthe-
tic theories of Hegel and Danto would result from a 
rereading of Gombrich. Fitted into a systematized 
theoretical framework, a reexamination of Gombrich’s 
theory could yield hypotheses which would not entail 
mimetic restrictions. Such a theory could aid in for-
ming a provisional general deﬁ nition of art that is sub-
ject to empirical testing. 
Habermas’ critique of Hegel is relevant to Gombrich 
in two ways. Habermas states, “Rationality has less to 
do with possession of knowledge than with how spea-
king and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge”.25 
Rationality should not be viewed as separate from the 
24 - Horowitz, p. 318.
25 - Habermas, Communicative Action I, p. 8.
among artists, critics and audience is shifting because 
art is in the process of reinterpreting itself. Indeed, the 
art produced today often requires the curator’s notes 
or the critic for clariﬁ cation, but not because art has 
ceded its communicative function to philosophy. Ra-
ther, the need for interpretation is due to the inunda-
tion of ‘artistic’ vocabulary with objects of the everyday 
coupled with a change in the syntactical usage of art’s 
traditional representative metaphors. Thus, the aid of 
the philosopher-critic is enlisted in communicating the 
artistic message because a need in the cultural form of 
art exists that will in time resolve itself through its in-
ternal process of schematic development.
Gombrich’s inability to make this case for himself in 
light of the changing styles he confronted after Warhol, 
suggests not a deﬁ ciency in his theory, but the lack of a 
systematic way to apply his empirical theories.28 Thus, 
Habermas’ second point comes into play. Rather than 
standing above the empirical disciplines, philosophy 
should integrate and interact with them. Philosophy’s 
relationship to art should be shifted from one that de-
ﬁ nes art’s nature and purview, to one of a “stand-in and 
interpreter”. In this capacity, philosophy, rather than 
making essentialist claims, could suggest “reconstruc-
tive hypotheses for use in empirical settings”.29 The role 
of philosophy as the interpreter of art would still exist, 
but not, as Danto argues, on the exclusive and ongoing 
basis required by art after it achieves emancipation 
in its ﬁ nal post-historical phase. Rather, philosophy 
would mediate between the specialized rationale of the 
28 - See Horowitz, pp. 315-18.
29 - Habermas, Stand-In, p. 310.
a communicative learning process27. If this process has 
ended with a narrative shift, as Danto’s depiction of 
post-historical art suggests, then art has ceased to aid 
in the development of cultural consciousness.
If the rationale of art lies primarily in its “opaque” 
method of communication, it is unacceptable for the 
interpretation of art to be permanently turned over to 
the philosopher-critic. Gombrich’s theory suggests art 
is struggling to establish a metaphoric language that 
has resonance with contemporary culture in a man-
ner, though non-mimetic, unique to art. The greater 
need of explanation today is a sign that the equilibrium 
27 - Habermas, unlike Hegel, does not envision art’s sublation into the 
inﬁ nite; rather, he argues that aesthetic discourse plays a vital role in 
maintaining the unifying force of communicative reason by providing 
alternative validity claims to those of science and morality within the 
backdrop of the lifeworld. Habermas does not argue that art is a com-
municative medium. His claim that the original structure of language 
is emancipatory does not extend to art. However, he argues that by 
using art, historical preunderstandings can be critically reexamined 
and reintroduced into a social discourse, providing a cogent alterna-
tive to the claim that the art of today must effect a radical break with 
the past. Within the specialized discourses of the separate spheres 
of knowledge, Habermas distinguishes discourses concerning the 
problem-solving questions of truth and justice oriented around “intra-
mundane learning processes” from discourses of “world-disclosure”, 
focusing on questions of art and matters of taste. Habermas argues 
that “a knowledge specialized in only one validity claim, which, without 
sticking to its speciﬁ c context, bounces across the whole spectrum 
of validity, unsettles the equilibrium of the lifeworld’s communicative 
infrastructure”. In order to prevent a state of disequilibrium from arising, 
symmetry must be maintained within the lifeworld’s communicative 
infrastructure between discourses of world-disclosure and the process 
of intramundane learning. World-disclosing discourse, according to 
Habermas, serves to examine the presuppositions of the lifeworld. This 
reevaluation comes about by subjecting the underlying preunderstand-
ings of the lifeworld to a critical discourse, enabling the presupposi-
tions of a culture to be scrutinized and altered without the necessity 
of a diremption from past tradition. Discourse of Modernity, p. 149, 
p. 319, pp. 339-40.
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to draw on the meanings manifest in prior works while 
adding new meaning via the artist’s addition to the dia-
logue. Gombrich’s theory demonstrated how art was 
used and how knowledge of art is acquired. Though 
his theory was not developed at a systematic level, he 
isolated the rationality of art. Reconstructing a general 
theory based on Gombrich’s multi-disciplinary study of 
visual representation would provide hypotheses which 
could be tested, and, I contend, would show that as the 
referential dialogue of art builds upon itself, its expan-
ded vocabulary will form a critical dialogue capable of 
communicating matters of critical signiﬁ cance. This 
would result, over time, in art’s decreased reliance on 
the mediation of the philosopher-critic. I
 
creators, critics and curators and everyday experiences 
of the lifeworld audience. By reestablishing art’s com-
municative rationale within the lifeworld, the original 
communicative function of language is strengthened.
To conclude, if, following Gombrich, we view the 
rationality of artistic creation as a reciprocal learning 
process rather than the transition from one narrative 
state to another, we can make sense of the changes in 
how art was made without yielding its communicative 
capacity to philosophy. Though the signiﬁ cance of late 
modern attempts within the artworld to create a new 
language were forgotten before the quest was comple-
ted, the process of reference and critical reexamination 
that artists employ to engage the audience persists.30 
Artists sought novel ways to interact with their behol-
ders in part due to the deﬁ ciency of traditional me-
thods. These novel attempts are intended to establish 
a dialogue with the spectators utilizing metaphors that 
resonate with the changing times. When a work re-
ferences one or more previous works, it relies less on 
conceptual explanation and more on recognition of 
the images extant in contemporary art.31 This creates a 
series of referential pointers within a work, allowing it 
30 - Artists representative of this movement can be found among the 
early twentieth-century abstract painters. Artists such as Mondrian, 
Kandinsky, Klee, Brancusi and Matisse, though coming from disparate 
backgrounds, all attempted to depict a world beyond the visible in their 
art. See Lipsey, pp. 21-2.
31 - Examples can be found in the works of appropriationist artists. 
They do not duplicate images found in the everyday or in the works of 
other artists merely as quotations or mimetic reproduction. They add 
to the image, progressively manifesting it with a meaning not present 
before. Examining the works of appropriationist artists, such as Sherri 
Levine or Elaine Sturtevant, as well as the works of artists like Robert 
Gober, reveals a referential dialogue unfolding within the artworld.
